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VI.—CASSANDRA'S APOLOGIA.
BY F. C. S. SCHILLER.
WOK is me, alas, alas 1 Oh that I had never met you, or had
never gained from you the baleful gift of prophecy! Oh that
these eyes might once more be blind to the impending doom of
sacred Ilium and the fall of Priam's kingly house ! Surely it is
better for mortals not to get what they most desire nor to have
prescience of the future they seek to know so eagerly!
Yes, my dear Cassandra, I thought you would soon begin to
regret the way you tricked me. But it is no use your making up
to me now. Your repentance is too late. The gifts of a god are
irrevocable, and even if I would I could not change the past.
You will continue to foresee the evils you will be powerless to
avert.
Woe is me, what shall I do ?
You had better betake yourself to a wholly contemplative life,
and devote yourself to the prevision of eternal truth which you
are privileged to behold. I admit that the life of action is more
fun, Dut I sometimes think it would be better, even for us gods,
to become just contemplators of all time and all existence and to
cease from interfering with the order of the world, whether to
reward or to punish mortals. Anyhow the vision of Truth should
be enough for you.
Even though it makes me wretched ?
Not all visions are beatific ; or rather the vision of a god alone
is that. But this you would not see when, you beheld me. So it
serves you right. You are justly doomed to foresee the hideous
truth, but whatever you predict, it will never be believed. Hence
your prevision will be vain. If that annoys you, as I see it may,
you can become indifferent to what is fated, and take delight
merely in your prescience of it. That is how we gods, and Pro-
fessor Alexander,' enjoy' whatever happens.
But how can I, being mortal, become indifferent to mortal
woes?
That is your look-out. I am merely telling you that you can
make your prescience painless and your life endurable by imitat-
ing me. After all, as yon can now no doubt foresee, I am merely
telling you, what Aristotle is going to prove, in another 1000
years or so, that the best life for mortals to lead is that which
apes that of the immortals as far as may be, however vainly.
No, I will not imitate you. You are horrid. I would rather
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CASSANDRA'S APOLOGIA. 87
die a thousand deaths than live like you. I detest you, and I do
not believe a word you say! Why should I believe the atrocious
vision you have conjured up before my eyes by some unholy
magic ? How do I know it is true ? How do I know that you
have not been trying to deceive me in this matter also ? How
do I know your gift is not an illusion and your promise false ?
When a god swears by Styx his promises are kept to the very
letter. If you will not now believe me, you will have to later on.
See, and wait, until what you have seen has come to pass.
What precisely has been promised me ? Do tell me again ; for
at the time I hardly grasped what you said.
I promised you tnat whatever you prophesied should come
true, but, to rebuke your insolence, I added that, whatever you
prophesied, no one should believe you.
I can understand that at first they might not believe me, if I
prophesied unpleasant things. Men are always reluctant to be-
lieve in the coming of evils, especially if they themselves have
brought them about. But if my prophecies came true and they
had frequently experienced this, how could they help believing ?
They would not, I tell you, however often you succeeded. Ex-
perience would make no difference.
How is that possible ?
They would be under a necessity of thought, stronger than any
fact, to think that false which you had asserted to be true.
But would not that be belief in necessary error ? How very
strange 1
No stranger than the belief in necessary truth.
Well it seems to me very queer. But tell me, Apollo, should /
be under the same necessity myself ? Should I too think false
what I myself had prophesied ?
I had not considered this point—which would you prefer ?
I do not think that you need consider my feelings; the point
is that whatever you say you will get into a difficulty.
Nonsense! How?
Well, unless I too did not believe that what I said was true,
you would be convicted of having promised falsely, and this
you swore by Styx you would not do. For it would not then
be true that no one at all believed what I prophesied. You will
have therefore to make an exception in my favour.
I will do no such thing. I had better say that what you
prophesy will be true whether you think it so or not, and so
even if you think it false. For your thinking it can make no
difference to the truth.
That sounds well, but I am not so sure about it. At any rate,
I wish you would tell me how I can at the same time both be-
lieve that what I prophesy is false and know that it will come
true?
Is not belief different in kind from knowledge ? You know the
truth, but believe the false. Where then is the difficulty ?
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' Knowledge' only seems to me to be a confident belief that is
not doubted: I wish therefore that yon would prove to me what
is the difference between them and how a belief may be known to
be knowledge.
Gods never prove anything; it would be most undignified.
They only speak with divine authority. If you want proofs you
will have to foresee those of Plato, the divinest of philosophers,
or the most philosophic of divines, and moreover (probably) a
son of mine I
That does not satisfy me, but before I inquire further, let me
thank you for the great privilege your gift bestows. I shall now
be able to lie as muoh as ever I please. It will be great fun.
What do you mean ?
Did you not say that whatever I said should come true ?
I did.
Well then whatever I say thinking it false will come true
nevertheless ?
Certainly.
Then I can lit with entire impunity.
I do not understand you.
Pardon my lapse into our barbarous Phrygian. But I do not
think there is any Greek word to express what I meant, namely
to say what is false willingly and knowing it to be false. Do you
not see what an enormous difference this makes ?
I do not see that it makes any. What you say is either true
or not, whatever you think about it. There is no third possi-
bility, is there ?
I suppose not.
You seemed to me therefore to be speaking nonsense when you
said just now that you would be able to prophesy false things as
much as you pleased. You could not prophesy falsely. You
could only prophesy truly. It would be impossible for you to
utter what you call a ' lie . Nor could you do so with impunity;
you would always be punished for spreading false news—because
no one would believe you.
What an intelleotualist you are, Apollo! I am afraid that though
you are a god and love some Trojans, you are very Greek at bottom.
Are you not entirely leaving out the speaker in arguing about the
spoken word? Do you really think it makes no difference what
he thinks about the truth or falsehood of what he says ?
Most certainly. None at least that it is reasonable to take
account of.
Then you think it makes no difference whether I prophesy what
I believe to be true or what I believe to be false, if only it comes
true ? Nor again whether I prophesy what is false voluntarily
or involuntarily, so long as it does not come true ?
In either case the true is true and the false is false.
Then you do not care whether an error is voluntary or in-
voluntary ?
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I care only whether it is great or small.
And you do not resent the attempt to deceive you which the liar
makes 7
Whoever speaks falsely deceives me, if I believe him.
You are at any rate a consistent intellectualist, Apollo.
The reasonable are always consistent.
Ah, but are the consistent always reasonable ?
Being a woman, Cassandra, you naturally do not admire the
logical virtues.
At any rate I should like to ask your opinion about a further
•question.
What is it ?
Have you not given me the power in certain cases to make
what is false true, simply by declaring it true, and in others to
make it true, by declaring it false ?
Why should I listen to such nonsense, seeing that not even a
god has the power of making the false true ?
If you will listen nevertheless, you will I think understand my
difficulty. Is it not possible to tell a sick man he is going to get
well, without believing this?
Certainly, even my son Asklepios often says this.
Well then, may not the giving of this assurance sometimes so
.encourage the patient as to enable him to recover?
Possibly.
Yet he would have died, if he had not received this assurance ?
Probably.
Then the assurance being false would have made true what
would otherwise have been false, simply by declaring it true ?
My son would say it was not by his assurance but either by his
superhuman skill, or by a miracle, that his patient was cured.
Again, may not a wicked physician frighten a patient to death
by telling him he is certain to die?
If he is fool enough to believe a doctor!
Nevertheless in this case too his belief will make a difference to
the truth.
I suppose I can escape from admitting this by telling you that
all is fated and no man can escape his fate.
Is that what you are going to tell me ?
No, I had rather let you go on.
Very well then, do you not think that if you prophesied that the
harvest will be bad, or again that it will be good, and if men be-
lieved you, the price of food will be raised or lowered in the
markets ?
I dare say, but you cannot expect a god to concern himself with
market prices.
But you say yon are concerned about the truth, and in all these
• cases the truth does seem to be affected by what men believe about
it. The belief that something will happen seems to make it
. happen, or else to make people take measures to frustrate it.
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At any rate, Cassandra, you cannot make things happen in this
way. For whatever yon say you will not be believed.
I cannot perhaps make the false true by declaring it true and
getting men to believe it true. But does it follow that I cannot
make the false true by declaring it false and so getting men to
believe it true?
I should think it did. If you cannot make the false true by
declaring it true, how can you by declaring it false?
You must remember that you have promised me that I shall
always be disbelieved. Hence by prophesying one thing I can
make men believe the opposite. If I prophesy a scarcity, they
will believe in an abundant harvest; so they will sell me their
corn, believing thai the price will go down. But as the harvest
will be bad, I shall be able to re-sell it for much gold when my
despised prophecy comes true. Thus I shall be able not only to
make that come true which I believe to be false but declare true,
but I can also get the others to believe true the opposite of this
which I shall seem to them to have declared false.
I did not understand. Only a devil, not a god, could-follow all
this.
Surely, Apollo, my point is simple enough for a child to follow.
If whatever I predict is disbelieved, I can in oertain oases foresee
that what will be believed will be the opposite of what I prediot.
I know also that what all believe is false. If therefore I act as if
what is universally believed true is false and as if what is be-
lieved false is true, I shall be prepared for what will happen, and
can guide my life by always behaving as if that were false which
all believe to be true.
Such was not the use I intended you to make of my gift.
Perhaps you did not understand what you were doing, and do
not understand even yet what I am intending to do.
I understand at least, that you intend to set at naught the
punishment I inflicted.
Does it come to so much as that ?
Yes, for by acting as if what you believe true were false, and
what you believe false true, you would be escaping all the evil
consequences of your false beliefs.
Well, why shouldn't I ?
Because it makes me doubt whether you really believe the false
things you say you believe, and disbelieve the truths you predict.
Why should you disbelieve what I say ?
Because you act so differently. And I suspect that your acts
»re better witnesses to your beliefs than your words. For it is
easier to deceive by words than by deeds.
It seems to me, Apollo, that you are now speaking like a prag-
matist.
What is that?
Oh, something that no one will understand for ever so long, for -
another 3000 years at least. And when they understand it, men
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will say that it is nothing new and that they have always been
pragmatists.
Then talking pragmatism must be very like talking prose. I re-
member I once asked Momus to tell me what that meant.
And he replied, I suppose, that it was what you always did,
especially in your oracular hexameters ?
Your impertinence equals his. Have you already forgotten the
woes that are in store for you ? If so, may I trouble you to turn
your prophetic eye upon your latter end, and to foresee by what a
death you are fated to perish ? It is better for mortals to medi-
tate upon such things than to bandy words with gods.
It is easier at any rate. But I was not unaware, even before
my eyes were opened, how piteous is the lot of mortals. I shall
suffer as bravely as Prometheus. And I divined also that you
gods were merciless and had no human feelings. That is why I
spurned your ' love'.
Like the silly girl you are! Had you not done so, you might
have escaped from the doom of Troy. Had you continued to
please me, I might have made you an immortal, or if not, at least
nave turned you into an evergreen, like dear Daphne, which is
the next best thing.
I had no thought of escaping my doom. But do not you gods
too think of your future ?
No, of course not. We live lightly, in the present, knowing
that the future holds no terrors for us.
Then the fate I shall prophesy will be news to you ?
If it is new, it will not be true.
Nevertheless it may be unpleasant.
Nonsense.
Shall I prophesy ?
If it amuses you.
Well then I prophesy that you too will be changed—into a
butterfly, Apollo,1 but will still remain Parnassian, and haunt the
mountain tops.
Do you expect me to believe that ?
Certainly not; but it will come true. However it may console
you to learn that you will still be beautiful.
Thank you for that I If I believed you, I should say that so
long as I remain beautiful I am still Apollo. And I suppose that
even though I became a butterfly on Parnassus I should still re-
main a god on Olympus.
There will be no gods left on Olympus and the rest will fare
worse than you.
I must say, Cassandra, that though of course I know your pro-
phecies are jokes, they are in the worst possible taste. Go home
to my temple and devote yourself to your priestly functions. I
am sure my sacred image has not been dusted for a week.
1
 Partuutiut Apollo.
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